Court of appeal holds that local agencies may be liable in damages for unlawfully delaying ADU permits
In a published decision that should get the attention of every local permitting agency in California, the Second District Court of Appeal held that a homeowner may sue an agency for damages under the Government Claims Act when the agency fails to perform its mandatory duty to ministerially approve an accessory dwelling unit (ADU) permit. See Shi v. City of Palos Verdes Estates, No. B350195, ___ Cal.App.5th ___, 2026 WL 3179539 (Oct. 23, 2026). The ruling opens a path to monetary relief for applicants who have been subjected to unlawful discretionary review and delay, and it significantly raises the stakes for jurisdictions that continue to slow-walk applications for ADUs—and potentially other types of housing as well.
Plaintiff Wei Shi applied in 2020 for a permit to build an ADU on his lot in Palos Verdes Estates, intending to complete it concurrently with his family home. According to the complaint, rather than processing the application ministerially within the statutory timeframe, the city required a conditional use permit, discretionary review, and approval by the Palos Verdes Homes Association Art Jury, and a city planning commissioner allegedly lobbied neighbors to oppose the project. The city did not approve the permit until 2023. Shi alleged that the three-year delay caused him over $1 million in damages, including loss of use, increased construction costs, interest expense, design professional fees, and diminished property value. He sued the city under Government Code section 815.6, which makes a public entity liable for injuries proximately caused by its failure to discharge a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment “designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury.” The trial court sustained the city’s demurrer, reasoning that the ADU statutes were meant to alleviate the housing crisis, “not protect the investments of individuals who choose to build ADUs.”
On appeal, the only disputed element was whether the duty in section 66317 was designed to protect against the type of injury Shi suffered; the court assumed, without deciding, that the statute imposed a mandatory duty and that its breach caused Shi’s injuries. Applying the framework established by the California Supreme Court in Haggis v. City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal.4th 490 (2000), the court emphasized that the inquiry turns on the California Legislature’s purpose in imposing the duty, not its purpose in enacting the statute as a whole. Viewed that way, the court found the question straightforward. Section 66317 requires that ADU applications be “considered and approved ministerially without discretionary review or a hearing,” generally within 60 days of a complete application where there is an existing dwelling, and it bars reliance on any local ordinance, policy, or regulation other than a compliant ADU ordinance as a basis for delay or denial. The direct beneficiaries of that duty are permit applicants. As the court put it, ministerial approval free of discretionary requirements and burdensome local regulation is not “incidental” to section 66317. “It is the point of section 66317.”
The court held that the statutory text was unambiguous but noted that the broader ADU statutory scheme confirmed its reading, citing the Legislature’s findings that homeowners who create ADUs “benefit from added income, and an increased sense of security” (§ 66310, subd. (c)) and its stated intent that local ADU regulations not “unreasonably restrict the ability of homeowners to create [ADUs]” (§ 66311). The court also discussed, though it did not rely on, legislative history for SB 1069 referencing “onerous requirements” that local governments had placed on individuals seeking to build ADUs. The court rejected the city’s argument that the ADU statutes create no private right of action and say nothing about damages, explaining that under Haggis, it is section 815.6, not the predicate enactment, that supplies the right of action. And while the court agreed that the Legislature intended ADUs to help address the statewide housing crisis, it reasoned that the Legislature chose to do so by imposing a duty on local agencies to approve permits ministerially, which makes permit seekers the direct and intended beneficiaries of that duty. The court distinguished the facts of Haggis, where the recording duty at issue was intended to benefit existing owners rather than subsequent purchasers, as having “little to do with this case.”
The most immediate implication of Shi is that ADU applicants now have a meaningful damages remedy in addition to the writ of mandate. Historically, an applicant facing unlawful delay could petition for a writ compelling approval, as in Riddick v. City of Malibu, 99 Cal.App.5th 956 (2024), but a writ does nothing to compensate for the carrying costs, construction cost escalation, and lost rental income that accumulate while the application languishes. By recognizing that section 66317 can serve as the predicate for a section 815.6 claim, the court has shifted the risk of noncompliance from applicants to agencies. Because the ADU statutes are frequently litigated and the alleged damages here exceeded $1 million on a single residential lot, local governments should expect that this decision will be invoked both in litigation and at the permit counter as leverage to secure timely approvals.
For cities and counties, Shi is a strong signal to audit ADU processing practices. Requirements that improperly convert a ministerial ADU review into a discretionary one, such as conditional use permits, design review by appointed boards, public hearings, or deference to private architectural review bodies like a homeowners association art jury, are precisely the kinds of practices alleged here. Similarly, agencies should track the 60-day review clock carefully and document the date an application is deemed complete. Notably, section 815.6 contains a built-in defense where the public entity “establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty,” and the court did not address that provision. Agencies that maintain clear, consistent, and well-documented ministerial review procedures will be in a far better position to invoke that defense than those whose files reflect ad hoc discretionary requirements or, as alleged here, staff or officials actively opposing projects.
It is also important to keep the procedural posture of Shi in mind. The case arose on demurrer, so the court accepted the complaint’s allegations as true and assumed, without deciding, that section 66317 imposes a mandatory duty and that the city’s breach caused Shi’s injuries. The city will still have the opportunity on remand to contest those elements, to argue reasonable diligence, and to raise any other defenses available under the Government Claims Act, including claim-presentation requirements and any applicable immunities. Future cases will likely test where the line falls between a truly ministerial obligation and the limited areas in which agencies retain judgment, such as determining whether an application is complete or whether a proposed unit meets objective standards in a compliant local ADU ordinance. Plaintiffs will also need to prove causation and damages, which may be contested where construction delays have multiple contributing causes.
The court’s reasoning may also have reach beyond ADUs. California has enacted a growing number of statutes that require ministerial, streamlined, or time-limited approval of housing projects, including SB 9 lot splits and duplexes, SB 35/SB 423 streamlined approvals, and the Permit Streamlining Act and Housing Accountability Act frameworks. Shi’s central analytical move, focusing on the purpose of the specific duty imposed on the agency rather than the general purpose of the legislation, provides a roadmap for applicants seeking to argue that other ministerial housing mandates are likewise designed to protect project proponents. Whether courts will extend Shi to those statutes will depend on their particular text and structure, but agencies should not assume that the general “housing crisis” purpose of such legislation will insulate them from damages claims.
Ultimately, Shi reinforces the Legislature’s repeated message that ADU approvals are to be ministerial and prompt, and it gives that message financial teeth. Homeowners and developers pursuing ADUs should preserve records of application submittals, completeness determinations, and any discretionary conditions imposed, and should consider timely presenting a government claim where unlawful delay causes quantifiable harm. Local agencies, for their part, should review their ADU ordinances, intake procedures, and staff practices to ensure strict compliance with section 66317.
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