Legal development

BIS issues Interim Final Rule restricting remote access to advanced US AI chips

    Action items for data centers, hyperscalers, chipmakers, and AI developers

    Executive summary

    On November 16, 2026, the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued an Interim Final Rule (IFR) to close the main route by which companies tied to China and other countries listed in the Export Administration Regulations' (EAR) Country Group D:5, and Macau—which BIS lists separately (collectively, Target Countries)—use U.S. AI chips without buying them: renting compute from data centers in third countries.

    The IFR takes effect upon publication in the Federal Register, scheduled for November 19, 2026.

    Key points for data center operators, AI developers, and their suppliers:

    • Serving China-linked customers at scale anywhere in the world will require a U.S. export license: A license will be required to ship covered items to any data center outside the United States that supplies companies based in Target Countries, or their subsidiaries elsewhere (Target Country Companies) with compute exceeding ~750 Nvidia H100s/330 B200s.
    • Existing arrangements have a short runway: Data centers already serving these customers need a license within 90 days of publication. Shipments already en route on the publication date can proceed under the prior rules if completed within 30 days.
    • Suppliers will demand customer information: If a foreign data center will not or cannot show its suppliers who its customers are and who owns them, the supplier is presumed to know of a prohibited use. Expect chip, server, and cloud vendors to require ownership and end-use certifications.
    • Five countries will need licenses for all advanced AI chip shipments: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Brazil were added because of perceived diversion risk. U.S.-headquartered customers will be exempt if the exporter files monthly reports.
    • There is a narrow exception: Computing power used only for e-commerce or social media recommendation engines is excluded if it is reported to BIS, but any use involving generative AI falls within the restriction.
    • And a notable gap: Because the rule regulates exports, not cloud services, it does not reach U.S. data centers. However, there is pending legislation in Congress—the Remote Access Security Act—which would close that gap.
    • Existing percentage-based policies are insufficient—the new controls use a fixed compute threshold: While certain data centers and hyperscalers may already have policies limiting Chinese customers below 50% of capacity, the rule uses a fixed computing threshold, so a large operator may need a license even if Chinese customers represent a small percentage of overall usage.
    • Biden-era AI Diffusion Rule formally repealed: The IFR expressly repeals? The Biden-era AI Diffusion Rule, including country caps and controls on AI model weights. Though the Rule was never enforced, questions remained about its applicability. Those are now answered: The Rule no longer applies.
    • Industry will have 60 days to comment: This is an interim final rule, issued without notice, which in the normal course will be replaced by a final rule following BIS’s consideration of comments submitted during the 60-day comment period. BIS’s notice accompanying the IFR hints at disagreement between BIS and other agencies, potentially leaving more room for affected members of the public to influence the final rule.
    • What to do now: Data center owners should identify every data center they own, supply, or use that serves Target Country Companies; build license time into projects in the five diversion risk countries; treat customer-ownership and compute-allocation data as export control records; and revisit customer, supply, and colocation contracts.

    The regulatory changes contained in the IFR—along with opportunities for comment, additional potential regulation, and practical implications for affected industries—are discussed in greater detail below.

    New data center control (15 C.F.R. § 744.24)

    The IFR adds EAR § 744.24, which requires a license to export, reexport, or transfer:

    1. advanced AI chips, products containing them, and related software and technology (ECCNs 3A001.z, 3A090 (except 3A090.c), 4A090, and .z items) (“covered items”)
    2. with “knowledge” (which includes awareness of a high probability or willful ignorance)
    3. that they are destined for a data center that will provide more than 12,000,000 “aggregate TPP” to or for Target Country Companies.

    The control is triggered by a low aggregate compute (TPP) threshold: The control applies to data centers that provide more than 12,000,000 total processing performance (TPP). 12,000,000 TPP equates to roughly 750 Nvidia H100 GPUs or roughly 330 B200 GPUs, and is aggregated across physically or digitally “linked” data centers, so spreading capacity across sites does not help. This represents a small fraction of a single large training cluster. Any hyperscaler servicing a significant Target Country Company should assume it is in scope.

    The control reaches indirect access: Access “for” a Target Country Company includes an intermediary that trains AI models for it, takes part in that training, or provides AI models to such a company. The IFR also does not distinguish cloud providers that own the chips from colocation providers whose tenants own them.

    Several other provisions extend the control’s reach:

    • Chip and server suppliers shipping to a data center are expected to be able to obtain and produce that data center’s know-your-customer (KYC) diligence, including direct and indirect ownership or control by Target Country Companies or other persons located in Target Countries. A refusal or inability to provide it is presumed to give “knowledge” of a prohibited use.
    • The EAR’s de minimis rule offers no relief. Foreign-made products incorporating U.S.-origin covered items remain covered where there is “knowledge” of a prohibited use at any point from development onward.
    • The control binds subsequent purchasers. Exporters making unlicensed shipments on or after publication must notify recipients that the items remain covered.
    • No license exceptions apply and license requests are reviewed case by case. BIS may notify additional parties that a license is required and may impose a license requirement within 10 days if additional countries are designated a diversion risk.

    The rule implicates data privacy considerations: The KYC information at issue may include personal information about customers' owners and controllers. Operators should confirm their privacy notices and customer contracts permit collecting that information with suppliers. These expectations must be assessed in light of local data protection or confidentiality laws that may also apply. Operators and suppliers should consider sharing mechanisms now.

    There is a narrow “commercial recommender” exception: The license requirement does not apply where a data center’s compute is provided only for a “commercial recommender system”—an AI tool “exclusively designed and exclusively used” to rank, filter, or suggest commercial products, services, or content) —provided relevant information is reported to BIS. The carve-out excludes any system that includes generative AI.

    Data centers that already provide “significant volume” of computing power to Target Country Companies must obtain a license within 90 days “or face future export restrictions.”

    • “Significant volume” may or may not be the 12,000,000 TPP threshold.
    • The license must be obtained, not merely applied for, within 90 days.
    • Because these exports occurred before the IFR, it is not clear what transaction the license would authorize. The stated consequence, “future export restrictions,” suggests that BIS expects to enforce this provision through Entity List designations and “is informed” notices rather than through standard EAR enforcement and potential penalties.

    A license requirement can also arise after the chips are installed, with no new shipment: BIS treats a switch from a permitted use to a prohibited one as a new “transfer (in-country)” that needs authorization. § 744.24(e) imposes only a notice obligation on the supplier, and a license requirement for the data center operator or other "transferor." Two common scenarios could trigger this: a Target Country Company acquires an existing customer, or an operator shifts capacity so a Target Country Company exceeds the TPP threshold. Operators should screen for these risks in M&A diligence and in customer change-of-control provisions, and condition expansion and capacity-reallocation rights on export control compliance.

    License requirement for Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Brazil

    The IFR will require a license for covered items to or within Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Brazil, citing “an unacceptable risk of diversion,” with case-by-case review that considers each country’s export control enforcement and cooperation with BIS. This requirement applies to every covered shipment into these countries—whether or not the items are intended for use in a data center, or that center would provide compute to a Target Country Company—and only a short list of license exceptions remains available.

    More countries may be added—BIS will monitor for countries that tolerate evasion and may respond with countrywide restrictions in addition to restrictions on the companies responsible.

    The requirement does not apply where the ultimate consignee or end user is a U.S.-headquartered company or its subsidiary, provided the exporter, reexporter, or transferor files monthly reports under new § 743.10. Shipments to a U.S.-headquartered operator still need a § 744.24 license if the operator’s data center serves Target Country Companies above the TPP threshold.

    Tighter rules for foundries and chip packagers

    The IFR also adds a license requirement for foundries and outsourced assembly and test (OSAT) providers to ship chips specified in ECCN 3A090.a designed by a company that is neither on BIS’s list of approved designers nor an “authorized” designer:

    • Before December 31, 2026, a designer headquartered in Taiwan or in Country Group A:1 or A:5, other than a Target Country Company, that shares specified information
    • After that date, authorized status requires a pending application for approved status and lapses 180 days after the application is filed

    Foundries and OSAT providers that make advanced logic chips (16/14nm node, or below. or with nonplanar transistors) must presume those chips are controlled.

    The IFR narrows the options to rebut the presumption. Foundries and OSATs could previously attest that a chip’s transistor count was below set limits (Note 1 to ECCN 3A090.a, paras. b.–c.). That option is no longer available for designers located in (or whose ultimate parent is headquartered in) Country Groups D:1, D:4 or D:5 (which includes Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Vietnam), or the five diversion risk countries (Note 1 to ECCN 3A090.a, paras. b.–c., cross-referencing 15 C.F.R. § 742.6(a)(6)(iii)(A)(1)).

    Rescission of the AI Diffusion Rule

    The January 2025 AI Diffusion Rule would have required licenses for advanced AI chips to virtually every country and, for the first time, controlled the “weights” of the most advanced closed AI models. The IFR formally removes the AI Diffusion Rule’s country tiers, License Exceptions AIA and LPP, the Data Center Validated End-User program, and the model-weights controls.

    Three existing provisions remain:

    1. The license requirement for Target Country Companies
    2. U.S. jurisdiction over certain foreign-made advanced chips and computers made with U.S. technology, even after they are built into boards or servers
    3. License Exception ACM, which supports chip manufacturing supply chains outside Target Countries

    BIS also says it will address model-weight risks through destination- and end-use-based controls, so exports to Target Country Companies may still garner regulatory scrutiny.

    Open questions and opportunities for comment

    The IFR takes effect on publication but is subject to modification based on comments submitted within 60 days after publication.

    Notably, BIS’s notice accompanying the IFR specifies that the IFR was “written by and at the direction of the Department of [the] Treasury and the National Security Council.” While other agency input into BIS rulemaking is common, such a stark disavowal by BIS is not. The statement suggests that BIS may not be fully satisfied with the IFR and may be particularly receptive to comments from members of the public.

    Potential issues for comment by affected industries include:

    • How to measure the TPP threshold—whether “access” means installed, reserved, or used capacity, aggregation across customers, and how far “linked data centers” reaches.
    • The diligence burden, since many data centers are bound by customer confidentiality terms that restrict sharing customer data. A certification or safe harbor would help.
    • Whether services may continue after the 90-day window while a timely application is pending, what “significant volume” means in § 744.24(b)(3), what transaction a license for already-installed chips would authorize, and who must hold that license where the data center operator does not own the chips.
    • How “for” applies to AI model developers that supply models to Target Country Companies, and how their compute counts toward the threshold.
    • Whether License Exception NAC/ACA (§ 740.8), which revised § 740.2(a)(9)(ii) still lists as available, can be used for the five countries.
    • Whether companies headquartered in close allies should get a reporting-based exclusion like the one offered to U.S.-headquartered companies.
    • Drafting errors, such as § 744.24(b)(1)’s reference to destination designations under “paragraphs (3).”

    Looking ahead

    Remote Access Security Act: The House passed the Remote Access Security Act (RASA, H.R. 2683) 369–22 on January 12, 2026. That bill and its Senate counterpart (S. 3519) are pending in the Senate Banking Committee.

    RASA would give BIS express authority to control “remote access” to items subject to the EAR by any foreign person. It would let BIS regulate the cloud service itself, rather than only the hardware shipment, closing the gap for capacity located in the United States. It would also leave the countries, subject items, and compute thresholds to BIS regulations. BIS will likely follow the precedent set by the IFR (and eventual final rule), meaning the IFR comment period may also influence eventual post-RASA rulemaking.

    Other developments to watch: Companies should prepare for further country designations, “is informed” notices, and Entity List actions against third-country compute providers. BIS’s Affiliates Rule, which would extend Entity List restrictions to companies 50% or more owned by listed parties, will add a significant layer to data center ownership diligence and is suspended only until January 10, 2027. U.S.-China trade talks, which have shaped the timing of recent BIS actions, may also affect implementation.

    Practical takeaways

    Because the IFR takes effect immediately on publication, data center operators, AI developers, and their suppliers should consider the following steps now:

    1. Map overseas data centers you own, supply, or use that host covered chips and serve, directly or indirectly, Target Country Companies, aggregating capacity across linked sites, and calendar relevant deadlines once the publication date is known.
    2. Prepare license applications now. The rule requires a license to be obtained, not just requested, within 90 days.
    3. Extend KYC to ultimate parents, with contractual rights to share it with suppliers and BIS. Do not treat vendor percentage caps as a proxy for the 12,000,000 TPP threshold.
    4. Add the change-in-use notice to sales terms and ownership-change, remote access, and audit provisions to cloud and colocation agreements. Allocate who applies for any required license, who supplies customer information, and what happens if a license is denied. For capacity in the five diversion risk countries, add regulatory-delay and substitute-region provisions.
    5. Set up monthly reporting for U.S.-headquartered customers in the five countries, and obtain licenses for all others.
    6. Review foundry and packaging orders for designer location, ownership, and approved status, and have authorized designers apply for approved status before December 31, 2026.AI developers should identify customers and partners headquartered in Target Countries and prepare for diligence requests from compute providers.
    7. Complete in-transit shipments within 30 days, consider voluntary self-disclosure where warranted, and comment within the 60-day window.

    Ashurst Perkins Coie’s International Trade and Data Center teams are closely monitoring the IFR’s publication and implementation. For assistance, please contact the authors or an Ashurst Perkins Coie lawyer.

    The information provided is not intended to be a comprehensive review of all developments in the law and practice, or to cover all aspects of those referred to.
    Readers should take legal advice before applying it to specific issues or transactions.