Investment Screening Act: Germany resets its FDI regime
In October 2026, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWE) published ministerial drafts of a new Investment Screening Act (Investitionsprüfungsgesetz, IPG) and an accompanying Investment Screening Ordinance (Investitionsprüfungsverordnung, IPV). The IPG would bring together in a single statute the German foreign direct investment (FDI) screening rules that are currently spread across the Foreign Trade and Payments Act (Außenwirtschaftsgesetz, AWG) and the Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance (Außenwirtschaftsverordnung, AWV).
The drafts are at an early legislative stage, and several passages remain open, including parts of the IPV sector catalogue and the date from which the new rules would apply. However, they already show the direction that German FDI screening is set to take.
The main changes in the proposed IPG are:
In October 2026, the BMWE published the ministerial drafts of the IPG and the IPV. The IPG would move the German investment screening rules, which have so far been split between the AWG and the AWV, into a single parliamentary statute. The IPV would list the security-relevant sectors that trigger a mandatory filing. The BMWE justifies the reform on the basis of a significantly worsened geopolitical security situation, in which economic means are increasingly used to pursue geostrategic aims. It also cites experience gained from screening practice and the 2023 evaluation of the current regime.
The IPG proposes substantive changes, including new screening triggers that bring more transactions into scope, alongside procedural changes designed to make the regime more predictable and streamlined.
The drafts also implement Regulation (EU) 2026/1386 (EU FDI Screening Regulation), which was adopted on 17 June 2026 and will apply from 17 January 2028 (see our client briefing). The EU FDI Screening Regulation requires every Member State to operate a national screening regime and sets minimum standards, including mandatory filings in certain sectors. As German law already goes further in most respects, the required changes are limited: the drafts add the EU-mandated case groups to the sector catalogue, end the privileged status of EFTA investors, align review periods with the EU FDI Screening Regulation and designate the BMWE as the national contact point for the EU cooperation mechanism.
The draft retains the basic logic of the current regime but reorganises it into three procedures:
The first two procedures trigger a mandatory filing and a standstill obligation. A single approval would replace the current distinction between a clearance and a certificate of non-objection in all procedures. The BMWE may switch procedures if it appears during a review that another procedure applies.
The IPG proposes changes to the thresholds, triggers and investors covered by the FDI regime.
For the first time, the IPG proposes separate thresholds for listed companies. Where the 25% entry threshold would otherwise apply, the threshold for acquisitions of stakes in listed targets would be lowered to 15%. The rationale is that low attendance at shareholder meetings often allows investors to obtain a de facto blocking minority with comparatively small shareholdings.
For unlisted targets, which make up the majority of transactions, the 10% threshold for the sector-specific procedure and the Section 2 IPV case groups, and the 25% threshold for the cross-sectoral procedure, would remain unchanged. For the remaining security-relevant sectors listed in Section 3 IPV (currently the 20% category), the IPG proposes raising the threshold to 25%. According to the explanatory memorandum, the evaluation of the regime showed that lowering the threshold to 20% in 2021 had no effect on restrictive measures, as such measures were only imposed in cases that the BMWE could have reviewed irrespective of the 20% threshold.
As at present, an increase in voting rights in a German target can trigger a filing requirement where certain thresholds are crossed. However, the IPG proposes several changes. Moving from an existing shareholding of 75% of the voting rights to 100%, which falls outside the scope of the current regime, would trigger a filing requirement. The reasoning is that a full takeover may remove any veto rights of the remaining shareholders and make the investor’s influence absolute. The 40% re-screening threshold, on the other hand, would be abolished. For listed targets in the sectors subject to the 10% entry threshold, a 30% re-screening threshold, modelled on the takeover threshold in the Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act (Wertpapiererwerbs- und Übernahmegesetz, WpÜG), would replace the 25% step.
Re-screening would therefore be triggered at 25% (or 30% for listed companies), 50%, 75% and 100% in the 10% sectors, and at 50%, 75% and 100% in the 25% sectors and in the cross-sectoral procedure. At present, depending on the sector, re-screening is triggered at 20%, 25%, 40%, 50% or 75%.
The rules on attributing voting rights would also be tightened. Voting rights that a third party holds for the account of the acquirer would be attributed to the acquirer in full, which captures trust and fund structures. Voting rights of parties acting in concert remain attributable. As at present, a rebuttable presumption of acting in concert applies where the acquirer and another shareholder come from the same third country and that country’s state bodies hold stakes in, or can otherwise influence, both of them.
The concept of a reviewable acquisition would be defined centrally and extended in several respects:
The IPV would carry over the existing case groups, refine several of them and add the case groups that the EU FDI Screening Regulation requires all Member States to screen. The main changes are:
Other case groups subject to the 25% threshold include high-grade earth observation systems, automated and autonomous vehicles and drones, certain robots, IT security products, aviation and space, additive manufacturing, data network equipment, certified smart meter gateways, companies employing staff in security-sensitive positions, goods covered by secret patents and agricultural land of more than 10,000 hectares.
The sector catalogue is not yet final. For many case groups, the explanatory memorandum states that further reasoning will follow once the ministries have agreed the wording, so the scope of individual sectors may still change. Some points reported before publication are already settled in the draft: cloud computing services whose infrastructure meets the KRITIS thresholds would fall into the 10% category, and the semiconductor case group would already cover research. Future changes could also come faster, as the BMWE alone could amend the sectors and thresholds by ministerial ordinance without the consent of the Bundesrat, subject to the Bundestag’s right to demand repeal within four months.
The IPG would make nationality, not only residence, decisive for who counts as a domestic or EU investor. Under the current rules, residence in Germany or the EU is sufficient for an individual to qualify as a domestic or EU investor. The IPG would additionally require the individual to hold exclusively German (or exclusively EU) citizenship. Dual nationals with a third-country passport would therefore always count as foreign or non-EU investors, even if they live in Germany or the EU. German–EU dual nationals living in Germany would count as foreign, but not non-EU, investors, so only the sector-specific procedure would apply to them. To justify this, the explanatory memorandum points to possible ties and civic duties towards the third country.
The nationality of individuals along the acquisition chain up to the ultimate beneficial owner (UBO) would therefore need to be checked closely. This affects founder, management and family office structures, as well as UBOs in fund and holding structures.
For legal entities, the test would continue to be based on their seat or place of management. Domestic branches and permanent establishments of foreign entities would count as legally independent.
In addition, the BMWE would assess whether the acquirer is subject to effective influence, rather than (as at present) control, by a third-country government, including other state bodies or armed forces, for example through its ownership structure or more than minor state funding. The same shift would apply to the presumption of acting in concert.
Under the current rules, German FDI law treats investors from EFTA states (Switzerland, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) in the same way as EU investors, so they fall outside the cross-sectoral procedure.
The IPG proposes to end this privilege because the EU FDI Screening Regulation treats every territory outside the EU as a third country. EFTA investors would therefore fall within the scope of the new regime in the same way as investors from any other non-EU country, in both the case-group-specific and the cross-sectoral procedures.
By contrast, the drafts do not extend the case-group-specific or cross-sectoral procedures to EU investors. Investors from other EU Member States would remain subject only to the sector-specific procedure.
The AWV currently contains only a narrow exemption for intra-group restructurings, limited to the cross-sectoral procedure and requiring all parties to be managed from the same third country. The IPG would extend the exemption to the sector-specific procedure. It would apply where the transaction takes place between companies wholly owned by the same parent and no new direct or indirect acquirer with its seat or place of management in another state joins the chain.
Acquisitions of German companies through resolution tools for banks, central counterparties or insurers would fall outside screening. The explanatory memorandum notes that such rescues must be decided within days and are already reviewed by the competent authorities.
Greenfield investments, i.e. the establishment of a new business in Germany by a foreign investor, remain outside screening. The reasoning is that greenfield investments lack the risks that come with acquiring an existing business, and that sector-specific legislation already regulates new businesses in critical areas.
As at present, the protected interests differ by procedure. In the sector-specific procedure, the BMWE examines whether an acquisition is likely to affect Germany’s essential security interests. In the other two procedures, it examines whether an acquisition is likely to affect the public order or security of Germany or of another EU Member State, or projects or programmes of Union interest listed in Annex II of the EU FDI Screening Regulation.
The IPG would also set out non-exhaustive assessment factors in the statute:
Under the current rules, the BMWE has two months in Phase 1 to decide whether to open an in-depth review, and four months in Phase 2 to reach a decision. The BMWE can also review non-notified transactions on its own initiative for up to five years after signing.
In line with the EU FDI Screening Regulation, the IPG proposes the following review periods, now counted in calendar days:
The shorter Phase 1 comes with a catch: the clock would start later. Under the current rules, the two-month Phase 1 period starts as soon as the BMWE becomes aware of the signing. Under the IPG, each phase would start on the day after the BMWE receives the complete documents required for that phase, as specified in a general administrative act to be issued by the BMWE. Filings made via the online portal would only count as received once the BMWE has fully imported them into its IT system. Preparing a complete filing therefore becomes the decisive timing factor, and it remains to be seen whether the BMWE will open Phase 2 more often in response to the tighter Phase 1 period.
The Phase 2 period would be suspended while the BMWE awaits information it has requested, while questions from other Member States or the European Commission under the EU cooperation mechanism remain open, and while the parties negotiate a public-law agreement. If the BMWE does not act within the deadlines, the acquisition would be deemed approved.
The BMWE must confirm receipt immediately and, where possible, flag incomplete or damaged documents. It may request additional information, and the explanatory memorandum treats 15 days as the normal response deadline. The Phase 2 period would start again if an approval is withdrawn, revoked or amended, if a court lifts restrictions or a prohibition, or if a party unilaterally terminates a public-law agreement governing the imposed remedies. A deemed approval would then only arise when the new period expires.
The direct acquirer must make a filing in relation to a notifiable acquisition without undue delay after signing or, for public takeover offers, after publishing its decision to make an offer. Filings must be made electronically via the BMWE’s portal. Where a transaction also requires screening in other EU Member States, the acquirer must file in all of them on the same day and cross-refer to the other filings.
Until approval, notifiable transactions remain provisionally invalid. The acquirer may not exercise voting rights, or receive security-relevant company information. Reviewable transactions that do not require a filing would take effect but would be subject to a resolutive condition until the review periods expire. This would now also apply to acquisitions that are not based on a contract. Acquisitions of securities on a stock exchange may still be completed, provided the acquirer notifies them without delay and does not exercise the voting rights until approval.
As soon as the BMWE learns of a signing or an imminent signing, it could impose interim measures, including restrictions on voting rights or information flows, the transfer of voting rights to a trustee at the acquirer’s cost and a prohibition on closing, including in the cross-sectoral procedure. It could issue information orders to third parties not involved in the transaction and discontinue proceedings that the acquirer does not pursue or that have become moot, without any deemed approval.
The IPG would give the BMWE a wide range of remedies and enforcement tools. A non-exhaustive list of remedies that may accompany an approval includes changes to boards or voting rights, conditions on access to sensitive technology or information, supply commitments, secure sourcing of critical components, cybersecurity protocols, storing and processing certain data within the EU, compliance reporting, a monitoring trustee at the parties’ cost and an obligation to report further acquisitions below the thresholds. Instead of issuing orders, the BMWE may conclude a public-law agreement. It could enforce remedies and prohibitions by restricting voting rights, ordering a sale or appointing a trustee to unwind a completed transaction, and it could request information and inspect business premises to monitor compliance. The BMWE could also share information with screening authorities outside the EU.
Orders may also target the parties’ affiliated companies, which would also owe information duties, including proof of citizenship. Orders and public-law agreements would run without a time limit, but the BMWE must review them periodically and the parties may ask for them to be lifted. Trustees must be competent, reliable and independent, and the acquirers would bear their costs jointly and severally.
Investors would no longer be able to rely on screening outcomes remaining confidential. The BMWE would publish prohibitions on its website and could publish orders and public-law agreements. According to the explanatory memorandum, its press releases would name the parties, the target’s sector and the general subject of any remedies, without disclosing business secrets. Access to screening files under the Freedom of Information Act would be expressly excluded, while the parties’ rights to inspect files remain unaffected.
The IPG would also tighten sanctions and change how parties challenge decisions:
If lawmakers enact the IPG in its current form, investors and targets should prepare to adjust their transaction planning by:
The drafts are at an early stage of the legislative process, and the start date remains open. The government must complete inter-ministerial coordination and consultation before the Cabinet can adopt a government bill and introduce it into the Bundestag, and several IPV passages are still marked as not yet agreed. The IPG and the IPV would enter into force on the day after promulgation. The new rules would apply to agreements signed, or takeover offers announced, from a date in 2027 that the drafts leave open, while earlier transactions would remain subject to the AWG and the AWV. For acquisitions that do not rest on a contract, the date of the act forming their legal basis, such as a shareholder resolution, would be decisive.
Investors should start tracking the key changes now. Lawmakers may still amend the proposal during the parliamentary process, particularly on the sector scope and thresholds, but the EU FDI Screening Regulation will in any event apply from 17 January 2028. In particular, the lower thresholds for listed companies, the new dual-use case group and the inclusion of EFTA investors could materially affect deal structuring and timetables for transactions signing after the new rules apply.
EU Foreign Investments Screening 2.0: What's New, What's Next
Authors: Sergej Bräuer, Partner; Dimitra Karakioulaki, Associate; Sarah Schaible, Transaction Lawyer; Aamir Hajjout, Research Assistant
The information provided is not intended to be a comprehensive review of all developments in the law and practice, or to cover all aspects of those referred to.
Readers should take legal advice before applying it to specific issues or transactions.