On 16 July 2026, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) handed down its judgment in RRC Sports v FIFA (Case C-209/23) on the compatibility of FIFA's Football Agent Regulations (FFAR) with EU law.
What you need to know
- ECJ confirms that rules of sports bodies governing relationships between their members and third-parties who have an economic interest in the organisation of sporting competitions are, in principle, permissible under EU competition rules (in line with its ruling in Rogon (Case C-428/23)).
- ECJ holds that FIFA rules capping football agent commissions, prohibiting representation of multiple parties to the same transfer, and introducing a new licensing regime for football agents (among others) do not constitute by-object restrictions of competition.
- To the extent they are found to restrict competition, FIFA's rules can benefit from the Wouters/Meca-Medina exception, taking them outside the scope of Article 101 TFEU if they are justified by legitimate public interest objectives and are suitable, necessary and proportionate to achieving those objectives.
- ECJ gives strong signals that the majority of FIFA's rules satisfy the Wouters/Meca-Medina conditions.
- The ruling has wider application to any sector where private associations, federations, or self-regulatory bodies set binding rules for market participants.
The road to Luxembourg
The ruling is the latest in a series of cases on the application of EU competition law to sports governing bodies, following, most recently, the Rogon judgment (Case C-428/23), concerning football agent regulations adopted by the German football association (see our July 2026 update). The RRC case concerned a new framework governing the activities of football agents in the global football transfer system, adopted by FIFA in December 2022 and implemented in two stages in 2023. The new framework includes rules capping agent commissions, rules prohibiting multiple representation to avoid conflicts of interest, and a new licensing regime for agents.
Football agents have a key role in player transfers, and therefore a direct and significant influence on the composition of football teams, their continuity and their sporting strength. Team composition constitutes an essential element of the competitions in which professional football clubs compete against each other and thus affects the integrity of football competitions and, therefore, the game of football as a whole.
FIFA's new rules respond to longstanding concerns in relation to the activities of some agents and their impact on the proper functioning of the transfer system, including, in particular, on young and inexperienced players.
Agents have challenged the rules in multiple jurisdictions and before multiple fora. The RRC ruling stems from a challenge before the German Regional Court of Mainz, which resulted in a wide-ranging reference to the ECJ, principally concerning the compatibility of the rules with EU competition law.
Competition law assessment: offside or fair play?
The Court’s starting point, consistent with its earlier ruling in Rogon, is that sports associations may legitimately regulate the relationship between their members and third parties with an economic interest in the sporting ecosystem, provided they comply with EU law.
By object, by effect and Wouters/Meca-Medina
The ECJ acknowledges that the FFAR were adopted solely by FIFA, which is not directly active in the relevant markets. However, since FIFA is composed of national football associations, which in turn are composed of clubs or single-entity leagues that engage in economic activities in various markets, FIFA may be regarded as an association of undertakings in these markets and upstream markets, including the market for the hiring of players/coaches and the market for agent services relating to the international transfer of professional players/coaches.
The Court also confirms that the FFAR as a whole and each of its provisions can be regarded as a “decision by an association of undertakings” for the purposes of Article 101(1) TFEU.
As regards the competition assessment, the ruling adds nothing particularly novel to recent case law as to the framework for by-object restrictions, in particular Tondela (Case C-133/24) (see our May 2026 update) – thus, in order to determine whether a rule must, by its very nature, be regarded as harmful to competition, it is necessary to examine the content of the rule, its economic and legal context and the objectives it is intended to achieve.
The Court analyses each provision of the FFAR referred by the national court, and concludes, although ultimately for the referring national court to verify, that with two exceptions none of the contested FFAR rules appear to amount to by-object restrictions.
In the case of the percentage caps on agent fees – the most controversial of the FFAR rules – the Court notes that it does not follow from its case law on by-object restrictions that the fixing of a maximum price, such as the fee caps, is, by its nature, necessarily liable to distort competition. Indeed, the Court observes that the caps do not appear to reveal a sufficient degree of harm to dispense with an examination of their effects. It notes in that regard that the rule does not establish a fixed remuneration cap but rather provides for a relative limit, proportional either to the player’s salary (when the agent represents the player or receiving club), or to the transfer fee (when the agent represents the transferring club). Therefore, the rule does not appear capable of deterring agents from intensifying their efforts to improve the quality of their services or from offering their services.
The ECJ leaves it to the referring national court to determine whether any of the rules not classified as by-object restrictions have restrictive effects. However, it provides some useful guidance on the application of the Wouters/Meca-Medina test, confirming its ruling in Rogon that Wouters/Meca-Medina can in principle apply to rules of a sporting association purporting to regulate non-members.
In particular, the ECJ confirms that the following objectives may qualify as legitimate objectives in the public interest:
- establishing minimum professional and ethical standards;
- protecting clients from unethical conduct;
- protecting players who lack experience or information about the football transfer system; and
- improving contractual stability between players, coaches and clubs (insofar as it concerns guaranteeing team stability during an ongoing season).
The Court concludes that, to the extent that any of the FFAR are deemed by the national court to have restrictive effects, most of them appear to pursue one or more of those legitimate public interest objectives and can be justified under the Wouters/Meca-Medina test. However, it is ultimately for the referring court to determine whether the rules do in fact pursue those objectives and whether they are suitable, necessary and proportionate to achieving them (i.e. whether no less restrictive measure would achieve the same result), as required by the Wouters/Meca-Medina criteria.
Thus, in relation to the caps on agent commissions, the ECJ considers that these appear to be capable of achieving (at least) the legitimate public interest objective of protecting clients against unethical conduct on the part of agents. In particular, the caps are capable of reducing the risk that agents find themselves in a conflict of interests, where they might be incentivised to act against their clients’ best interests. As regards the proportionality of the caps, the ECJ notes that they are proportional to the salary of the player or to the transfer fee, such that agents retain the ability to compete on price and all other relevant parameters, such as quality of service or innovation. In addition, the Court notes that there is no limit on the fees that agents may charge for services not related to transfers.
Final whistle: lessons for sports governance and beyond
July 2026 will be remembered as a good month for sports governing bodies. In particular, the ECJ has confirmed that centralised sports governance bodies can validly pursue ethical, integrity-based and protective objectives through binding rules, including, as a matter of principle, rules covering third parties within their sporting ecosystem, such as sports agents. The Court has also endorsed a broad range of legitimate public interest objectives capable of supporting such rules, which can, in principle, apply to a wide range of measures, including caps on agent fees.
Of wider interest, beyond sport, the judgment offers principles of general application to any sector where private associations, federations, or self-regulatory bodies set binding rules for market participants. While such bodies remain subject to EU rules, they retain meaningful room to justify their rules by reference to legitimate public interest objectives, including ethical standards, protection of participants and system integrity, and provided that any restrictions are suitable, necessary and proportionate to achieving those objectives.
Want to know more?
- Agents on the pitch: regulating third parties in sport
- Moving the goalposts: Tondela – no-poach agreements and sporting rules
Authors: Donald Slater, Partner; Peter Turner-Kerr, Counsel; Raphael Dionis, Associate
